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2(3)(i), unless the definition of "local agency" under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) is broad enough to include a city itself as 
opposed to its agencies. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
In short, may a city use fees for city-owned electric 
services as revenue raising tax substitutes? 
In more detail, may a city which owns and operates an 
electric utility system, under Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-1 et seq., 
set rates for utility service such that large surpluses are 
anticipated and generated which are regularly transferred to the 
general fund and used for general city obligations, and which 
result in one-third of all general revenues of the city? 
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CONTROLLING STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 22 states: 
Private property shall not be taken 
. . . for public use without just 
compensation. 
Utah Code An. § 55-3-10 states: 
Rates for services furnished by any project 
or service as described in Section 55-3-1 
hereof shall be reasonable and uniform in 
respect to class at all times. They may be 
fixed precedent to the issuance of the bonds. 
Such rates shall be sufficient to provide for 
the payment of the interest upon and 
principal of all such bonds as and when the 
same become due and payable, to create a bond 
and interest sinking fund therefor, to 
provide for the payment of the expenses of 
administration and operation and such 
expenses for the maintenance of the project 
or service, necessary to preserve the same in 
good repair and working order, to build up a 
reserve for depreciation, to build up a 
reserve for improvements, betterments and 
extensions other than those necessary to 
maintain the same in good repair and working 
order, and to pay the interest on and 
principal of any other bonds or obligations 
outstanding and issued in connection with the 
purchase, construction, repair or improvement 
of the project or service. Such rates may be 
fixed and revised from time to time so as to 
produce these amounts and the governing body 
may covenant and agree in the ordinance or 
other legislative enactment authorizing the 
issuance of such bonds and on the face of 
each bond at all times to maintain such rates 
for services furnished by the project or 
service as shall be sufficient to provide for 
the foregoing, but not in excess of a 
reasonable rate for the service rendered. 
(Emphasis added.) 
vi 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A citizen of Brigham City challenges overcharges for 
city-owned electric power which result in large, anticipated and 
realized surpluses which are regularly transferred to the city's 
general fund and used for general obligations of the city. 
When it became undisputed that approximately $1,500,000 
yearly in electric utility surplus revenues were being 
transferred into the city's general fund, the citizen/plaintiff 
moved for partial summary judgment. It was "partial" because it 
related only to the surplus electric utility charges, and his 
complaint was broader. The lower court denied the motion. 
The city then filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment which was granted. 
The citizen/plaintiff appeals 1) the denial of his 
motion for partial summary judgment, and 2) the granting of the 
city/defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. See Facts, 
below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For years, Brigham City has regularly budgeted that the 
rates it charges the Appellant and others for its city-owned 
electric power will produce huge surpluses. Such surpluses, 
approximately $1.5 million per year, are generated, transferred 
to the general fund, and used for general city obligations. 
vii 
Electric utility charges are fees for a service. 
Taxes, not fees, may be used to generate revenues. Regularly 
anticipating and realizing large revenues from the charging of 
utility fees is illegal under statute and case law, and 
constitutes an unconstitutional taking without just compensation. 
Use of utility fees to raise revenues alters the 
legislatively created scheme for spreading tax burdens. 
The granting of the City's motion for summary judgment 
was therefore improper and appellant's motion for summary 
judgment should have been granted. 
FACTS 
1. Defendant/Respondent, Brigham City Corporation 
(hereafter "the City") is a municipal corporation, the remaining 
defendants were members of the city council and/or agents of the 
City in charge of collecting for electrical usage. 
2. The City owns and operates the only electric 
utility within the city which provides power to 
Plaintiff/Appellant. R. at 286; 290, para. 2; 330, para. 7; 638-
39; 641, para. 1; 654, para 7. 
3. Plaintiff/Appellant (hereafter the "Citizen") is a 
resident of the City and a retired plumbing contractor living on 
limited means, owns real estate within the City, and subscribes 
to an pays for public utility service provided by the City owned 
viii 
electric utility. R. at 057, para. 1; 178, para. 1; 290, para. 
2; 405, para. 1. 
4. Monies paid to the City for electrical power are 
held in a consolidated utility fund with separate accounting for 
electric utility revenues. R. at 290, para. 5; 329, para. 5; 
641, para. 6; 653, para. 5. 
5. The rates which the City charged and charges the 
Citizen and all other citizens of the City for electric power, 
were set by the City to yield, consistently, large surpluses over 
and above the costs of providing the utility service. R. at 059, 
paragraphs 16, 22; 181, paragraphs 16, 22; 286. See also, 
paragraphs 10 to 11, below. 
6. The costs necessary to provide the service consist 
of the following, as set by statute: 1) the payment of interest 
and principal of all bonds, 2) a bond and interest sinking fund, 
3) payment of the expenses of administration and operation and 
maintenance of the project or service, 4) creating a reserve for 
depreciation, and 5) creating a reserve for improvements, 
betterments and extensions other than those necessary to maintain 
the system. Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-10. 
Thus the surpluses anticipated and received by the City 
were expected by the City to exceed, and exceeded all costs to 
provide the utility service. 
7. The surpluses were transferred to the City's 
general fund, commingled with tax revenues received by the City 
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and used for general obligations of the City. R. at 061, para. 
23; 181, para. 17; 182, para. 23; 286; 290, para. 6; 641, para. 
7; 653, para 1. 
8. The City regularly set rates for power usage high 
enough to yield large surpluses; budgets approved by the City 
specifically contemplated the generation of the following 
electric utility surpluses in the following fiscal years: 
1986-87 $1,275,859 
1988-89 $1,275,858 
R. at 215, para. 45; 242, para. 45; 278, para. 2; R. at 251 
(Facts not disputed by the City). Budgets for other years 
included similar anticipated surpluses, but the amounts are in 
dispute. R. at 228-246. 
9. The City budgets contemplated that the anticipated 
electric utility surpluses would be transferred from the 
consolidated utility fund to the city's general fund and used for 
general city obligations. Ld. and R. at 060, para. 17 & 18; 178, 
para. 1; 181, para. 18. 
10. Anticipated surpluses were actually realized by 
the City. The City recovered the following surpluses in the 
following years: 
1982-83 $1,184,996 
1983-84 1,193,931 
1984-85 1,494,993 
1985-86 1,770,678 
1986-87 approx. 1,275,000 
1987-88 1,275,858 
x 
R. at 212, para. 26; 236, para 26; 238, para. 31; 239, para. 36; 
241, para. 41; 242, para. 45; 244, para. 53. 
11. All anticipated or actual electric utility 
expenses for each fiscal year were: 
Budgeted Actual 
1982-83 
1983-84 1,194,796 
1984-85 2,026,170 
1985-86 2,286,893 
1986-87 2,706,559 
1987-88 
1988-89 
R. at 214, para. 39; 215, para. 44; 238, para. 31; 239, para. 36; 
240, para. 39; 242, para. 44; 243, para. 48. Budgeted and actual 
expenses for other years where no figure is listed were similar, 
but the exact amount in dispute. R. at 228-246. 
12. A simple comparison of paragraphs 10 and 11, 
above, indicates that the charges to rate-payers which resulted 
in the revenues to pay the electric utility expenses and to 
provide the surpluses in paragraph 10, were almost double that 
necessary to provide the services alone. In fiscal year 1983-84, 
the costs of providing the electrical services was almost the 
same as the surplus transferred to the general fund, therefore 
the charges to rate payers was almost double that which was 
necessary. 
13. The fact that the surpluses, their anticipation 
and their use, were not in dispute is also illustrated by the 
xi 
statement of the City's counsel at oral argument February 25, 
1991: 
The charges for utility services have 
historically, in Brigham City, generated a 
surplus, . . . That surplus is transferred 
pursuant to the City's budget process to the 
general fund and is used for general 
municipal activities. 
Transcript of hearing at 2, 
1
 The transcription of the hearing was designated as part of 
the record but was not numbered by the district court clerk. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS GRANTED BELOW, 
THIS COURT WILL AFFIRM ONLY WHEN NO GENUINE 
ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS AND THE MOVING PARTY IS 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
FACTS WILL BE REVIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE CITIZEN. 
It is well settled law that the standard for review is 
as stated in the point heading above: 
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate 
only when no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In considering 
an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, 
we review the facts in a light most favorable 
to the losing party below. 
Little America Hotel v. Salt Lake City, 785 P.2d 1106, 1107 (Utah 
1989), quoting Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 
P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). The trial court's conclusions are 
accorded no deference. Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. The 
Great N. Baseball Co., 786, P.2d 763, 767 (Utah 1987). Citations 
to the quotation and Blue Cross and Blue Shield are omitted. 
The lower court not only granted the City's motion for 
summary judgment, but denied summary judgment to the Citizen. 
Because the Citizen lost its motion for summary judgment, facts 
relating to that motion for summary judgment should also be 
considered in a light most favorable to the Citizen. 
1 
POINT II 
BY STATUTE A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION MAY NOT 
CHARGE MORE THAN IS REASONABLE AND NECESSARY 
TO RECOVER CERTAIN COSTS OF PROVIDING 
ELECTRIC UTILITY SERVICES. EXCESS CHARGES 
ARE PROSCRIBED. 
Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-1, et seq. provides for public 
works programs. Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-1 authorizes any city to 
construct electric and other power plants and distribution 
systems. 
Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-10 limits the fees which may be 
charged by such a public works program to those sufficient to 
provide for producing the power and operating the system in 
question, and not in excess thereof. See § 55-3-10, above at vi. 
Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-10 states that: "Rates for 
services furnished by any project or service as described in 
Section 55-3-1 hereof shall be reasonable . . . " The statute 
continues by stating that such rates: "shall be sufficient to 
provide for" specified costs of doing business, including 
reserves: 1) paying interest and principal of all bonds, 2) 
creating a bond and interest sinking fund, 3) paying the expenses 
of administration and operation and maintenance of the project or 
service, 4) creating a reserve for depreciation, and 5) creating 
a reserve for improvements, betterments and extensions other than 
those necessary to maintain the system. Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-
10. The above contemplate all costs necessary to operate the 
system. 
2 
The statute is clear that the rates which may be fixed 
may produce sufficient revenues to provide for those areas 
mentioned above, but not amounts in excess thereof: 
Such rates may be fixed and revised • . . so 
as to produce these amounts, and . . . 
maintain such rates for services furnished by 
the project or service as shall be sufficient 
to provide for the foregoing. but not in 
excess of a reasonable rate for the service 
rendered. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Under the present circumstances, the City does not set 
the rates sufficient to provide only for costs of operation 
mentioned above and not in excess of a reasonable rate for the 
service rendered. The City sets rates for the specific, 
contemplated purpose of creating surpluses which the City 
specifically declares will be transferred to the general fund. 
The rates are set to produce revenue, not just provide a service. 
The City then diverts that revenue into the general fund as 
contemplated in the budget. Such a practice is unlawful and 
should not be countenanced. 
The court below denied plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment on the facts and law just recounted. The Citizen 
submits that the lower court should have granted the Citizen's 
motion for summary judgment on the undisputed facts and should 
have held that the excess charges, anticipated by the City in its 
budget, collected and diverted to the general fund, were 
improper. Instead of doing this, the court held to the contrary, 
3 
finding that no factual circumstance could be proved whereby the 
excess charges could be violative of the above-mentioned statute. 
That decision was error. 
POINT III 
BY CASE LAW, CHARGES FOR UTILITY SERVICES ARE 
FEES NOT TAXES AND MOST NOT BE IN EXCESS OF A 
REASONABLE RATE FOR THE SERVICE RENDERED. TO 
THE EXTENT THEY ARE USED TO RAISE REVENUE 
THEY ARE ILLEGAL. 
Courts in Utah have long made a distinction between 
fees and taxes. A fee is a charge imposed for a service 
rendered, and may not exceed the reasonable cost of rendering 
that service. If the fee is greater than the reasonable cost of 
rendering the service, resulting in revenue, it is considered a 
tax, and is inappropriate, beyond statutory authority, and even 
unconstitutional. 
In Ponderosa One Limited Partnership v. Salt Lake City 
Suburban Sanitary Dist., 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987), this Court had 
before it the issue of "whether the payment of sewer service 
charges is the payment of a tax." jEd. at 636. If the sewer 
service charges were a tax, then certain limitations on filing 
suits would apply. 
This Court specifically held that sewer charges are 
fees not taxes: 
"Sewer charges and fees are not taxes or 
special assessments, but are in the nature of 
tolls or rents paid for services furnished or 
4 
available." 11 E.McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations § 31.30a (3d Rev.Ed. 1983). See 
also, Jennings v. Walsh, 214 Kan. 398, 521 
P.2d 311 (1974). 
Id. at 637. The court continued: 
In Home Builders Association of Greater Salt 
Lake v. Provo City, 28 Utah.2d 402, 503 P.2d 
451 (1972), and Murray City v. Board of 
Education, 16 Utah.2d 115, 396 P.2d 628 
(1964), this Court denied the 
characterization of a sewer charge and a 
connection charge as a revenue measure and 
stated that such charges are neither taxes 
nor assessments but payments for services 
furnished. Home Builders Association, 503 
P.2d at 452. That characterization is echoed 
in City of Stanfield v. Burnett, 222 Or. 427, 
353 P.2d 242 (1960), overruled on other 
grounds, Aloha Sanitary Dist. v. Wilkins, 245 
Or. 40, 420 P.2d 74, 77 (1966), where 
property owners not hooked up to the sewer 
system had challenged the city's imposition 
of a fee and where the court found that "a 
charge for the use of a sewer is not a tax or 
assessment, but a charge for a service 
rendered and is based on contract." 
Id. at 637 (Emphasis added). The court finally concluded that 
the sewer charges were not a levy to raise revenues, therefore 
not a tax: "The fee therefore was a use charge and not a levy to 
raise revenues." Jd. at 638. 
In Mountain States Telephone v. Salt Lake County, 702 
P.2d 113 (Utah 1985), this Court considered a county ordinance 
levying a utility tax on the sale of utility services in 
unincorporated areas of the county. The court found that local 
revenue measures are ultra vires where they are supported by 
nothing more than the power to regulate. The court then quoted 
5 
with approval, an Illinois case, City of Chicago Heights v. 
Public Service Company. infra, wherein the Illinois court: 
"struck down an ordinance which imposed 
license fees greatly in excess of the 
reasonable cost of regulating the use of the 
City streets. See also 12 E McQuillin, 
supra, Paragraph 34.82 at 200 ("the fee is 
invalid if its amount is so much in excess of 
that necessary for supervision and inspection 
that it is clear the fee is one for 
revenue"). 
Id. at 118 (Emphasis added). The court cited other cases from 
other jurisdictions with approval, such as Chesapeake v. Potomac 
Telephone Company v. City of Morgantown, 143 W.VA. 800, 105 
S.E.2d 260 (1958). 
In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Emery County, 702 P.2d 121 
(Utah 1985), several businesses sought declaratory judgment, 
injunctive relief, and a refund of fees paid, challenging the 
validity of portions of an Emery County business license 
ordinance. The district court declared the challenged portions 
unconstitutional and beyond Emery County's statutory authority, 
and enjoined any further efforts to enforce the provisions. The 
portions of the statute challenged required payment to the county 
of an additional business license fee of one-half of one percent 
of the fair market value of goods sold, where such value exceeded 
$150,000 per year. In finding the fee inappropriate, the court 
specifically found that the money to be generated thereby (over 
$800,000), as the money in the case at bar, "was to go into Emery 
County's general fund to be expended for general county 
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purposes." Id. at 123. The lower court also found that the fee 
bore no relationship to the cost of enforcing the ordinance, and 
the monies generated appeared to be general revenue. 
This Court affirmed the district court, and discussed 
the distinction between a licensing fee, which must reasonably 
relate to the costs of the service, and a fee primarily to raise 
revenue under a municipality's taxing power: 
Fees for services which were not under the 
taxing powers "must bear some reasonable 
relationship to the cost of regulating the 
business so licensed." Weber Basin Home 
Builders Association v. Roy, 26 Utah 2d 215, 
217, 487 P.2d 466, 467 (1971). 
Id. at 123. The court considered Utah Code Annotated § 17-5-27 
which authorizes the county commission to "license for a purpose 
of regulation and revenue all and every kind of business not 
prohibited by law." Id. at 123 (Emphasis added). In spite of 
that statute which apparently authorized a county to charge a fee 
to obtain revenue as well as to recoup costs of service, this 
Court affirmed its prior holding in Cache Co. v. Jensen, 21 Utah 
207, 61 P.303 (1900), and declared that the county could not 
charge a fee to "raise revenue through licensing except insofar 
as such revenue is necessary to, and therefore proportionate to, 
the cost of regulation of the licensed entities." Consolidated 
Coal at 127. 
In Laffertv v. Pavson Citv. 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982), 
this Court considered an "impact fee" of $1,000.00 per family 
7 
dwelling unit prior to issuance of any building permit. The 
district court held that such a fee was not proper. This Court 
affirmed the district court's reliance on Weber Basin Home 
Builder's Association v. Roy City, 26 Utah.2d 215, 487 P.2d 866 
(1971), where the lower court invalidated "an increase in a 
building permit fee on the basis that it was an illegal tax." 
Id. at 378. The district court invalidated the fee because it 
was in the nature of a tax to raise revenue: 
The opinion notes that the purpose of the 
increase was to obtain additional money for 
the city's general fund, into which the 
proceeds were deposited. 
Id. at 378 (Emphasis added). This Court affirmed the district 
court. This Court cited several cases where "fees were imposed 
to finance a specific municipal service or capital expenditure" 
which the court felt was proper. However, the fee in question 
and that in the Weber Basin Home Builders case was 
distinguishable, "on the basis that a reasonable charge for a 
specific service is permissible whereas a general fee that 
amounts to a revenue measure is not. Home Builders Association 
of Greater Salt Lake, 28 Utah.2d at 404, 503 P.2d at 452." Id. 
at 378 (Emphasis added). The court then affirmed, stating that 
impact fees deposited in the city's general fund were an illegal 
tax: 
We affirm that distinction and agree with the 
district court's conclusion that the impact 
fee deposited in the city's general revenues 
8 
in this case is an illegal tax. Weber Basin 
Home Builders Association v. Roy City, supra. 
Id. at 378. 
In Banberrv Development Corporation v. South Jordan 
City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981) (Hereafter "BanberrvM, this Court 
upheld the validity of water connection and park improvement fees 
assessed against developers of real property. The court cited 
Home Builders Association v. Provo City, 28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P.2d 
451 (1972), discussed below at Point IV, wherein this Court 
sustained the validity of a sewer connection fee which was 
imposed in order to improve and enlarge the sewer system. The 
court found that the improvement fee was not a revenue measure or 
an assessment, but a "reasonable charge for the use thereof," 
Banberry at 903, because the funds generated were to be used in 
reasonable relation to the service provided: 
. . . the funds obtained were to be 
restricted to the enlargement, improvement, 
and operation of the sewer system and to the 
retirement of indebtedness incurred in its 
construction. 
Id. at 309. 
This Court also quoted a New Jersey case. The Court 
held that a connection fee could be more than the direct cost 
incident to hooking up the sewer, if the additional fees were 
only an equitable means of sharing earlier costs for such a 
facility: 
Therefore, where the fee charged a new 
subdivision on a new property hook up exceeds 
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the direct cost incident thereto (as a means 
of sharing the costs of common facilities), 
the excess must survive measure against the 
standard that the total costs "faLI equitably 
upon those who are similarly situated and in 
a just proportion to benefits conferred." 
Id. at 903. 
In Call v. The City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 
1980), developers attacked an ordinance requiring subdividers to 
dedicate seven percent of proposed subdivision land or pay 
equivalent of that value in cash. This Court upheld the required 
dedication of land, but only if the evidence reasonably 
established that the municipality will be required to provide 
more land for parks and playgrounds as a result of the 
subdivision. Again, the fee for the service must reasonably 
relate to the service. 
See Smith v. Carbon County, 90 Utah.2d 560, 63 P.2d 259 
(1953), wherein the court stated that fees may be charged for 
services rendered in probate proceedings, but they must bear some 
reasonable relation to the extent and nature of the services 
rendered, otherwise such fees are in contemplation of the law 
taxes. Cases from other jurisdictions are in accord. 
In City of Chicago Heights v. Public Service Commission 
of Northern Illinois, 97 N.E.2d 807 (111. 1951), cited favorably 
by this Court in Mountain States Telephone v. Salt Lake County. 
above, the Supreme Court of Illinois considered a city's attempt 
to enforce an ordinance requiring the public utility to pay $5.00 
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for every pole, and $.025 for each wire crossing each street, and 
other charges. The court held that: 
The license fees charged must bear some 
reasonable relation to the additional burdens 
and necessary expense involved in the 
regulation and supervision of the business 
affected, otherwise the ordinance imposing 
the license fees will be regarded as a 
revenue measure and being unauthorized deemed 
null and void. Ward Baking Company v. City 
of Chicago, 348 111. 212, 172 N.E.2d 171; 
Nature's Rival Company v. City of Chicago. 
324 111. 566, 155 N.E.2d 356; Bauer v. City 
of Chicago, 321 111. 259, 151 N.E.2d 902. 
Id. at 810 (Emphasis added). The court recognized that fees may 
be unreasonable as a matter of law: 
A license fee may, however, be so grossly 
excessive as to be deemed arbitrary and 
unreasonable as a matter of law. City of 
Chicago Heights v. Western Union Telegraph 
Company, 406 111. 428, 94 N.E.2d 306; (other 
citations omitted) in the first Chicago 
Heights case, we specifically held that the 
fees imposed . . . were so grossly excessive 
as to be unreasonable as a matter of law. 
Id. at 810. The court held that the fees in question were 
excessive and unreasonable as a matter of law. 
The City of Chicago Heights case was cited with 
approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Mountain States Telephone 
v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 113 (Utah 1985). See discussion of 
that case, above. 
In Park Towne v. Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission, et al.. 433 A.2d 610 (Pa. 1981), the issue before the 
court was whether or not rate payers should be charged for 
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imprudent management of the utility company. The Public Utility 
Commission of Pennsylvania held that the utility customers were 
not so responsible, and the Pennsylvania court agreed: 
We agree with the Commission that PECO's 
(Philadelphia Electric Companies) customers 
are not required to reimburse the utility, 
through rate changes, for expenditures 
imprudently made as the Supreme Court wrote 
in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. 
Pennsylvania Gas & Water Company (citation 
omitted): "The original cost of the property 
is not to be taken as controlling (in the 
ascertainment of the fair value of a 
utilities property for rate making purposes), 
for there may have been extravagance in 
purchasing, or bad management . . . " 
In Williams v. Hawkins, 372 S.2d 1010 (Fla. 1979). The 
court of appeals cited the Florida Supreme Court for the 
proposition that "if a license fee was unconnected with the cost 
of regulating the utilities which would pay the fee, then it is a 
tax and illegal." Id. at 1010. 
The City in the present case is in the same position as 
the public utilities mentioned above, and may not charge for more 
than reasonable expenses to create general revenues. 
In the present case there is no factual dispute 
concerning the surpluses intended and generated by the City 
through its excessive charges. For the past several years the 
City has created budgets which anticipated and expected the 
reasonable costs of utility services to be far less than revenues 
generated by the City's rates. The budgets expected that almost 
1.5 million dollars per year in overcharges would be transferred 
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from utility accounts into the general fund to be used for 
general obligations of the City. 
Not only did the City expect and budget for the excess 
utility charges which would be transferred to the general fund, 
but transfers of almost 1.5 million dollars were made in each 
year at issue, at least from 1982. The percent of over-charging 
utility customers is gross and excessive, constituting almost 
double the amount reasonable and necessary to provide the 
service. Such charges are unlawful, and should not be allowed. 
POINT IV 
TAKING OF PROPERTY BY CHARGING EXCESS FEES 
NOT REASONABLY RELATED TO THE SERVICES 
PROVIDED IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING IN 
VIOLATION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
In Call v. The City of West Jordan, supra, this Court 
cited a Missouri case favorably which held that fees reasonably 
related to the services provided are permissible, but if they are 
not so reasonably related, payment of such fees "amounts to a 
confiscation of private property in contravention of the 
constitutional prohibitions . . . " Call at 1259 quoting Home 
Builders Association of Greater Kansas City v. City of Kansas 
City, 555 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Missouri 1977). 
In Weber Basin Home Builders Association v. Roy City, 
supra, Roy raised its building permit fee from $12.00 to $112.00 
and admitted that it had not experienced commensurate increases 
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in the cost of running its building department in issuing 
permits. The fee was simply additional revenue for the city. In 
that case, the court held that such excess charges were 
unconstitutional. 
Cases from other jurisdictions concur with this Court. 
In City of Chicago Heights, supra. the Illinois court 
affirmed a prior holding, City of Chicago Heights v. Western 
Union Telegraph Company, 94 N.E.2d 306 (111. 1950). In the 
earlier, 1950, City of Chicago Heights case, the Illinois Supreme 
Court found that fees required to be paid were unconstitutional 
because they merely went into the public treasury without the 
service being provided for which the fees were supposedly 
charged, just as the fees in the case at bar: 
A closer scrutiny of the ordinance under 
attack discloses that there are no other 
essential features there ordained, except the 
collection and payment into the general 
treasury of the City of the fees therein 
provided for and consent to the erection and 
maintenance of any poles and wires by the 
City Council. No standards or specifications 
are prescribed, no inspection or supervision 
is required, no disposition is made of the 
fees to be paid thereunder except that they 
be paid to the City clerk and presumably into 
the general fund of the City. 
Id. at 308 (Emphasis added). 
In Conoco, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 
520 So.2d 404 (La. 1988), the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated 
that the public service commission's power to fix rates was 
limited by the Constitution. 
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In State of North Carolina, ex rel Utilities Commission 
v, Edmisten, 263 S.E.2d 583 (N.C. 1980), the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina recognized that rates for utilities should be 
reasonable and must be consistent with state and federal 
constitutional provisions: 
Chapter 62 of the General Statutes confers 
upon the Commission both the power and the 
duty to compel the public utility to render 
adequate service to its public customers in 
return for reasonable rates (citation 
omitted)• These rates are to be fixed by the 
Commission as low as may be reasonably 
consistent with due process requirements of 
the State and Federal Constitutions. 
Utilities Commission v. Duke Power Company, 
285 N.C. 377, 206 S.E.2d 269 (1974). 
Id. at 587. 
Even the statutes involved recognized that courts 
considering actions of the commission "may reverse or modify the 
decision if the substantial rights of the appellants have been 
prejudiced because the Commission's findings, inferences, 
conclusions or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional 
provisions, . . . Id. at 588, Note 3. 
In the present case, the amount of overcharges are 
clear. Each year anticipated surpluses are taken from the 
utility funds and placed in the general fund for general City 
obligations. That is established as a matter of law. 
Clearly the utility charges are excessive and merely a 
revenue device, a tax. That tax constitutes an unconstitutional 
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taking of property without just compensation and is unlawful. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 22. 
POINT V 
RAISING REVENUES THROUGH UTILITY FEES IS 
ILLEGAL AND ALTERS THE STATUTORY BURDENS OF 
TAXES. 
The Legislature of Utah has set up a specific plan for 
taxation of citizens by the state and by municipalities. That 
system of taxation contemplates the spreading of the tax burden 
in a certain manner. Allowing a municipality to use service 
charges as revenue raising taxation is contrary to the 
legislative plan for spreading the tax burden, and is therefore 
illegal. One example, proffered to the court in the hearing of 
February 25, 1991, at p. 222, illustrates how revenue raising 
fees alter the tax burden under the present circumstances. 
Volcraft is a large industry in Brigham city which owns real 
property on which it operates. The property is within, but at 
the edge of, the City. It does not receive power from the City-
owned electric utility system. As a property owner, Volcraft 
would be assessed real property taxes which would become part of 
the general revenues of the City. If the City raised all monies 
in its general fund through real property taxes and not utility 
2
 The transcription of the hearing was designated as part of 
the record but was not numbered by the district court clerk. 
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surpluses, Volcraft would pay a certain number of dollars in 
taxes. 
Because a significant portion of the general revenues 
is raised through excessive utility service charges, the amount 
of money needed to be raised by real property taxes is decreased 
by the amount of surplus utility fees transferred to the general 
fund. Thus the amount of money which Volcraft pays in real 
property taxes is decreased. The utility users, such as the 
Citizen, make up that decrease in real property tax through 
payment of the excess utility charges. 
Another example, proffered to the court at page 23 of 
the transcript of the February 25, 1991 hearing, is renters who 
pay their own utilities. Such renters would pay no real property 
taxes, but the real property taxes for the rich are kept low 
because the renters pay excessive utility fees which go into the 
general fund. 
The situations concerning Volcraft and utility paying 
renters illustrate the illegality in the City's actions in 
altering the legislatively created method of spreading the tax 
burden. In fact, the Volcraft example illustrates why the 
Citizen's motion for summary judgment should have been granted. 
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POINT VI 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE POSITION OF THE 
CITIZEN. 
The City admitted to those facts set out under "Facts," 
above, that the City had budgeted for the surpluses indicated 
therein, and had regularly obtained anticipated surpluses, and 
had transferred the amounts stated therein to the general fund. 
The Citizen's expert, a certified public accountant, 
economist, and, at the time, a senior manager in the accounting 
firm of Ernst & Young, reviewed financial records of the City 
which indicated the costs and expenses of providing electrical 
service within Brigham City, which comport with Utah Code Ann. 
S 55-3-10, quoted and discussed at length under Point II, above. 
He stated: 
6. I have reviewed financial records 
which indicate the expenses and 
costs of providing electrical 
service within Brigham City, 
including but not limited to: the 
payment of interest upon the 
principal of bonds related to 
electric utilities; bond and 
interest sinking funds; payment of 
expenses for administration, 
operation and maintenance of the 
utility service; and reserves for 
depreciation. 
7. From my review I have formed the 
conclusion that the amount of 
monies charged to electric utility 
users, for electric utility 
services in Brigham City, exceed 
the costs and expenses mentioned in 
paragraph 6, above; and result in 
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excess funds which are transferred 
by Brigham City to its general fund 
and used for public purposes other 
than for the provision of electric 
or other utility service. 
R. at 722. Of course, his opinion is really unnecessary. The 
City's admitted consistent creation of approximately 1.5 million 
in surpluses year after year establishes that revenues exceed 
costs. 
Not only did the expert conclude that the monies 
transferred to the general fund were used for general obligations 
of the City and not for provision of utility services, he also 
was of the opinion that the amounts paid by the Citizen were 
excessive for the services provided: 
8. I have also concluded that the 
utility payments made by Mr. Leo 
Walker, are in excess of a pro rata 
rate for the cost to Brigham City 
of services rendered to Mr. Walker. 
R. at 723. 
POINT VII 
TRIAL WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IF CITIZEN'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY 
DENIED. 
The court denied the Citizen's motion for summary 
judgment even though there was no genuine issue of fact that 
excess utility charges were anticipated and charged to the 
Citizen and others similarly situated, and that the surpluses 
were regularly put in the general fund and used for general 
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obligations of the City. There was no dispute that the rates 
charged by the City for electrical utilities constituted a 
revenue measure. Summary judgment should have been granted in 
favor of the Citizen. 
Even if such summary judgment should not have been 
granted, summary judgment was not proper for the City. In 
Laffertv v. Payson City, above, this Court recognized that trial 
was appropriate where the reasonableness of the fees was at 
issue: 
The district court . . . put plaintiffs to 
trial on the reasonableness of those fees. 
That was the correct procedure. Banberry 
Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 
supra: Home Builders Association of Greater 
Salt Lake v. Provo City, supra. 
Id. at 378. 
After the trial in Lafferty, the district court and 
this Court were able to see that the fees were reasonable because 
they, "represent the cost of creating, maintaining and using the 
aforesaid utilities." Id. at 378. The court continued that the 
municipality needed to disclose the basis for its calculations 
that the fees were reasonable: "The municipality has the burden 
of disclosing the basis of its calculations to whoever challenges 
the reasonableness of the fees." Id. at 379. Because the 
district court in Lafferty did not take into account all of the 
potential factors which the district court should have considered 
under a then recent Banberry case, the court remanded the case to 
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the district court for taking of additional evidence, if 
necessary, consistent with Banberry and the factors stated 
therein for determining whether or not the fees were reasonably 
related to the services provided. 
This case also should have gone to trial even if, 
somehow, the undisputed fact of the excessiveness of the City's 
fees and the use thereof as a revenue measure should not have 
resulted in the grant of the Citizen's motion for summary 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that the City regularly, consistently 
and intentionally overcharged the Citizen and others similarly 
situated for utility services in order to create large, yearly 
utility surpluses which were transferred regularly into the 
general fund and used for general City obligations. Such 
overcharges were revenue raising, illegal taxes outside the 
legislatively established method of taxing, and of allocating tax 
burdens. 
The summary judgment in favor of the City should be 
reversed, the denial of the Citizen's summary judgment should 
also be reversed, and the case remanded to the district court for 
entry of orders halting the overcharging at issue and finding 
damages. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEO A. WALKER, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
BRIGHAM CITY, PETER C. 
KNUDSON, BETH W. GURRISTER, 
DAVID G. HACKING, DEE J. 
HAMMON, ROBERT B. SHELTON, and 
MARK A. WALKER, REDEVELOPMENT 
AGENCY NO. 1 OF BRIGHAM CITY, 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY NO. 2 OF 
BRIGHAM CITY: MICHAEL T. 
COSGROVE, and JOHN OR JANE 
DOES I THROUGH X, 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO, 870030069 
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The Plaintiff bases his claim partially on the allegation 
that the action by the city of charging rates / which he argues 
are unreasonably high, is amoving other things an 
unconstitutional taking. For reasons set forth in the 
Defendant's Memorandum and Reply Memorandum this Court agrees 
that the issue here does not necessarily rise to the level of 
constitutional magnitude. 
The city does not argue that the Plaintiff may challenge 
the rate making process, or more specifically the rate levels, 
and agrees that this Court has the power to review the rate 
making process to determine if it is free from arbitrary and 
capricious exercise of power and that rates are reasonable for 
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the service provided. 
The two approaches are directly related. The Court has the 
power to review either the rates or the rate setting procedure 
where the rates are so unreasonable as to be the result ^ of 
arbitrary and capricious action. Caution obviously has to be 
exercised in order not to intrude in an unwarranted fashion on 
the legislative function, nor to make the Court a rate making 
body. 
This Court observed at the hearing, that if the legislature 
wanted to limit the municipality's power to charge rates in 
excess of those necessary to cover the costs, etc., it could 
readily have done so. The Legislature did provide that the 
rates charged are to be sufficient to provide for payment of 
the interest and principle, to create funds, pay for 
administration and operation, maintenance, depreciation 
reserve, impropriety, etc. It neither specifically allowed or 
precluded profit - over and above that necessary for the above 
mentioned purposes. 
It is apparent from the language that the Legislature 
envisioned the municipality charging enough to provide the 
service in order that the service be not 'dependent-on taxes-or 
other revenues to support the same. What the statute however 
does not say is that, "such rates shall only be sufficient to 
provide such payments, etc.". Had it done so, the Plaintiff's 
argument would be easier to approach. 
Moreover, both parties appear to agree that the 
municipality may, though not specifically authorized by the 
statute or prohibited therefrom, charge enough for a reasonable 
profit to be realized. The statute neither mentions nor 
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defines "reasonable profit", but does mention rather 
"reasonable rates", specifically/ "reasonable rate for the 
service rendered". The issue then before us on this Motion for 
Summary Judgment is whether there are facts in, dispute as to 
the allegation that Brigham City officials acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously in setting the rates for utility services and or 
are the rates unreasonably high. 
Defendant would separate the actual consideration of the 
rates from the rate setting process. This Court is not so sure 
that that can be done. If the rates are unreasonably high then 
it may follow the process or acts of the Brigham City officials 
would therefore have to be likewise unreasonable/ arbitrary or 
capricious. The task of the Court it seems then, is first to 
define "reasonable rates" by finding the legal standards to 
apply/ then examine the rates charged to determine their 
reasonableness. 
The parties introduced affidavits and portions of 
transcripts of depositions stating that the rates charged by 
Brigham City are related to those charged by investor owned 
utilities and utilities owned and operated by municipalities of 
a similar size. Plaintiffs Affidavit states that, among other 
things, the rates charged are higher than needed for payment 
and maintenance as provided by the statute and that the excess 
funds are transferred to a general fund used for other public 
purposes. 
Though the Defendants argue that this is not the 
appropriate forum in which to question the wisdom of the 
legislative discretion on the part of the Brigham City council/ 
the Defendant does admit that if in fact the Brigham City 
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council acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in -establishing these 
rates or if the rates are unreasonably high then review by this 
review is proper. 
No allegations are made or supported for the purpose of 
this Motion that the city's procedure of establishing the rates 
is improper, that it failed to comply with the statutory-
provisions or municipal ordinance in establishing the rates 
except that the rates are higher than needed to provide for the 
cost of production as envisioned by the statute and that the 
rates were established with the intent of producing a surplus 
to be transferred to the general fund. The actual procedure 
with which the city undertook to set the rates, other than 
above stated/ is not challenged. (There was some argument by 
the Plaintiff that historically the city did not comply with 
the statutory requirements, but since this action is for 
injunctive relief that issue is not particularly material for 
this Motion for Summary Judgment.) 
The Defendant has argued that reasonableness is a matter of 
fact and this Court stated earlier in a Memorandum Decision 
issued on August 11, 1988, that facts are necessary to 
determine whether the rates being charged - are excessive or 
unreasonable. For cited authorities the Plaintiff has argued 
that in the Ventura case (Hansen vs. the City of 
San-Buenaventura, 729 P.2d 186 California 1986) involved only a 
3% return on the rates wherein this case there is a 30% rate of 
return. Defendant has cited Triangle Oil. Inc. vs. North Salt 
Lake Corporation, 609 P.2d 1338 (1980) for the principle that 
the Court should exercise its powers of review only if it is 
shown that the exercise of municipal power is* M s^o wholly 
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discordant to reason and justice that its actions must be 
deemed capricious and arbitrary and thus in violation of the 
complainant's rights". 
The problem lies in discussing rates of return as opposed 
to rates for services rendered. The statute does not preclude 
any certain- rate of return or profit, what it does require is a 
reasonable rate for the service rendered. The question then is 
not one of percentage of profit; i.e., rate of return but rate 
charged for the value of the service rendered. That is what 
the Court suggested in the August 11, 1988, Memorandum 
Decision, that fees may not be in excess of the value of the 
service provided. The city is not precluded bv that statute 
from obtaining a certain rate of return, even a high rate of 
return or profit, but it is precluded from charging a rate not 
reasonable for than the value of the service rendered. This is 
likely so because the city is the only provider of that 
service. If the city charged rates greatly in excess of the 
value of the service rendered, and since it is the only 
provider in Brigham City by state law, then that rate would be 
unreasonable and violative of the statute. 
Contrary then to the Plaintiff's argument it would appear 
that the determination of the value of the service rendered 
must take into comparison the rates charged *for similar 
services provided to other consumers. That would necessarily 
require an analysis of the rates charged by other municipal 
providers and by other non-municipal providers. The cost of 
producing the power by each individual provider is not the 
bench mark against which the rate charged is compared, but 
rather it is the value of the product provided or service 
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rendered. 
Value is generally determined by what the ^consumer is 
willing to pay. Economics dictate that the higher the rate 
charged perhaps the less the consumer is willing to buy and the 
lower the rate charged the more the consumer is willing to 
buy. However, because the Plaintiff and other individuals in 
his position are a "captive consumer" it seems to this Court 
that the amount other consumers are paying here and elsewhere 
is a better criteria for determining reasonableness than the 
costs of production as the best analysis of the value of the 
service rendered. The term "reasonable"/ as used in the 
statute should be defined by comparison. Stated another way 
the city then is not restricted to a cost basis analysis to 
determine its reasonable rates, but the reasonable rates are to 
be determined by the value of the service rendered. The only 
way to reasonably determine the value of that service rendered 
is to compare like services and rates. 
If the city were selling its power for substantially higher 
rates than like services provided by other providers or if the 
city were selling its power for rates considerably lower than 
sufficient to provide for maintenance of the costs as required 
by statute then the Plaintiffs argument would be well taken. 
But the uncontested fact that the city is charging rates 
reasonably comparable to those charged by other providers, even 
though higher than they need to in order to cover costs, does 
not demonstrate that the rates are unreasonably high or that 
the city acted unreasonably in exercise of its legislative 
power. If the city government wants to charge less than what 
it is charging now, but still sufficient to cover the costs, it 
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may do so under the statute but that is a legislative .function rrsca 
to be controlled by the City Council and is an area~ in .which tne 
the Court should not intervene. Defendant's Motion for Summary -r^s* 
Judgment is therefore granted. Counsel for the Defendant is 
directed to prepare a formal Order in conformance herewith. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEO A. WALKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM CITY, PETER C. KNUDSON, 
BETH W. GURRISTER, DAVID G. 
HACKING, DEE J. HAMMON, ROBERT 
B. SHELTON, and MARK A WALKER 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY NO. 1 of 
BRIGHAM CITY, REDEVELOPMENT 
AGENCY NO. 2 of BRIGHAM CITY; 
MICHAEL T. COSGROVE, and JOHN 
or JANE DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
On March 21, 1989 the parties, through counsel, appeared 
before the Court for argument on several motions, including 
plaintiff's and defendants' Motions for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The plaintiff was represented by Robert R. Wallace 
and defendants were represented by Jeff Thome, Merrill Hansen 
and Craig L. Barlow. The parties had submitted Memoranda in 
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support of their motions and opposing the motions* On 
August 11, 1988 this Court issued a Memorandum Decision 
on both Motions for Partial Summary Judgment • The plaintiff 
had not submitted a memorandum in response to the defendants1 
motion at the time the Memorandum Decision was issued despite 
the fact that counsel for defendants had agreed that the 
plaintiff could have additional time to file a responsive 
memorandum. The Court allowed the plaintiff to submit a 
reply memorandum and has now reviewed all of the memoranda 
submitted as well as the Court's file of the entire matter 
and considered the argument of counsel. Based on the Court's 
review and analysis its Memorandum Decision of August 11, 1988 
granting defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
claims 1 through 6 of plaintiff's Amended Complaint remains 
the Court's decision in this case. The Court also grants the 
defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Leo Walker 
submitted in support of plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing 
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court finds 
there are no disputes of materj^ i-JLasufiLS ftf fact and the 
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on claims 1 through 
6 of the plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Therefore, it is 
hereby 
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants' Motion 
for P a r t i a l Summary Judgment i s granted, with prejudice 
and p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for Summary Judgment i s denied, 
p a r t i e s t o bear t h e i r own c o s t s . 
DATED t h i s j,?^ day of [V)^\ , 1989. 
FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
By 
Judge Gordon Low 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
By ^zC^v5^S^^^^ 
Robert R. Wallace 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
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PERSON a 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, r> 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEO WALKER 
Plaintiff, 
V S . ] 
BRIGHAM CITY ET AL ] 
Defendants. ] 
, ££32* WK«SS« 
| MEMORANDUM DECISION 
| FILE NO. 8 7 0 0 3 0 0 6 9 
In this matter Leo Walker has filed a motion for 
Summary Judgment, seeking therein a Declaratory Judgment, that 
the electrical utility fees charged by Brigham City, 
Corporation to its customers are excessive and 
unconstitutional and for an injunction enjoining Brigham City 
Corporation from collection of excess fees for utility 
services, an injunction preventing Brigham City from 
collecting the purposed $2.00 per month additional fee for an 
electrical service and for attorney fees; 
The relationship between the action for Summary 
Judgment and the specific causes of action in the complaint is 
unclear. The Plaintiff alleges the grounds for the motion are 
that the charges made by Brigham City for Utility Services are 
excessive and constitute a taking of Plaintiff's property 
without constitutional due process, therefore in violation of 
both Federal and State Constitutions and the excessive charges 
are violative of the Utah Code annotated. Section 55-3-3. 
There appears to be no dispute that between the years 
1983 and 1987, the Defendant, Brigham City collected funds in 
charges for utility services and transferred certain of tnose >,.^  
FILED 
AUG 1 1 1 9 3 0 
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funds into the City's general fund. The funds collected were 
in excess of the sums of moneys required to operate the 
electrical services provided by the city. Further allegations 
are that during 1988 the City will transfer $1,275,858.00 from 
the Utility Funds to the General Fund, that those-funds 
represent monies in excess of expenses relating to the 
providing of electrical utility services. In addition thereto 
the City is proposing a $2.00 per month electrical hook-up fee 
for all persons using utilities during 1988-89. Neither of 
the cases cited under section 1 of the Plaintifffs brief are 
directly on point but are argued to be applicable by inference 
or by implication. 
It appears to the Court that one focal point of this 
issue is^ what is meant under Section 55-3-10 of the Utah Code 
annotated where in the City is authorized to charge rates for 
services provided but not in excess of those "reasonable for 
service rendered". Plaintiff argues that because the City 
charges more for its electrical service th^n it needed to meet 
the expense of providing this the service, it is therefore in 
excess of a "reasonable rate for the service rendered". No 
evidence or facts are supplied relative to what is a 
"reasonable rate for the service rendered". In other words 
though the City may be charging more for ^the^service thari"it 
costs the City to provide the same, that may not be 
dispositive of the question of whether the charge is in excess 
of "reasonable rate for service" rendered". 
The Court is left unaware of the facts as to whether 
the Plaintiff is receiving his moneys worth or if the rate is 
"reasonable for the service" he is provided or even how and if 
that could be calculated. But it seems overly simplistic to 
conclude that since the City receives more than it expends 
related to electrical service that therefore its rate is "in 
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excess of a reasonable rate for the service rendered". It 
seems to the Court that far more information and facts are 
needed before Summary Judgment can be granted on that issue. 
The Defendant further argues since that this -is not a class 
action, Plaintiff must therefore be able to show that the 
service charges he pays individually are unreasonable. Again 
those are further facts which are not supplied and are of 
which the Court is unaware at this juncture. Whether the 
Plaintiff's claim is cognizable under the Federal Statute 
cited in the complaint cannot at this time be determined. 
The Plaintiff's second point essentially is that the 
charging by the City of excessive fees not reasonably related 
to the services being provided is a taking of property in 
violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The threshold 
problem in this section of the Plaintiff's argument is the 
same as the first, that is this Court is without sufficient 
facts to determine whether the fees being charged are 
excessive fees, unreasonably related to the service provided. 
The fees obviously are in excess of the cost of 
providing the service but they may not 'be in excess of the 
value of the service received. Further facts"lmust Tbe provided 
the Court on that issue. The Court distinguishes the case of 
Weber Basin Hombuilder Association vs. Roy City as there was 
apparently no showing by Roy City, that it had experienced a 
commensurate increase in the cost of running the building 
department, therefore justifying the increase from $10.00 to 
$112.00 in building permits.The builder was receiving no real 
benefit from the issuance of the building permit and therefore 
it was easily determined that the increase to $112*00 was not~ 
reasonably related to the service provided. In this case 
however the Plaintiff is apparently receiving electrical 
service and the question is whether or not what he pays for it-
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is "reasonably related to the service provided". The 
defendant further argues in response to point 2, that the 
exact nature of the property right which the Plaintiff 
alleges that he is being denied must at the on-set be 
determined and that the Plaintiff has failed to identify the 
same. 
Obviously if the Plaintiff refused to pay what he 
considers to be an excessive rate, that the utility service 
will be discontinuted, therefore depriving him of a property 
right which can only be done so legally if in fact the charges 
are not excessive; otherwise the termination may be illegal 
and an unconstitutional taking. Before we. get to that issue, 
the question of excess charges and the questions of the 
charges and their reasonableness and the relationship to the 
service rendered must be determined. 
The Plaintiff's request therefore under point 2, for 
Summary Judgment is denied and the claim under point 3, for 
Attorney Fees is premature and therefore also denied. 
The Defendants have moved this Court to strike the 
affidavit of the Plaintiff. Where the motions are denied, 
there is no need to rule on motion to strike. 
The Defendants have filed motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on several portions of the complaint. 
With respect to all claims against individual 
defendants, they relate entirely to legislative functions, 
even setting the budget, determining rates and expenses 
allocable to the operation of the electrical and sewer 
facilities in State, are legislative in nature and are 
protected by an unbrella of immunity. 
The first six claims of the plaintifffs complaint ar 
Federal Civil Rights Claims. Remaining issues are brought 
under State law with respect to claim 1, of the plaintiffs 
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complaint, the same alleges that the City is involved in a 
Civil Rights violation against defendant by taking property 
without just compensation, violative of the fifth amendment of 
the United States Consititution. This Court specifically 
finds that that allegation does not state a Federal Civil 
Rights claim. In the denial of the Plaintiff's Summary 
Judgment, this Court pointed out that the Plaintiff has not 
shown that the rates charged are unreasonable, as 
reasonableness must be determined on more factors than just an 
expense/rate basis. It further assumed that the action is 
being brought under the Civil Rights Acts, section 1983 of the 
Civil Rights Act. But even if the allegation were true, that 
does not constitute a valid claim under that act. Rather the 
nature of alleged protected property interest of which the 
Plaintiff is being deprived is not articulated, though the 
defendant argues that the Plaintiff's relationship to the City 
is contractual and therefore it does not fall within the ambit 
of Constitutional protection. The Court does not necessarily 
agree that that is dispositive of the question as the services 
are far more than a contractual relationship. The City is the 
only agencey able to provide such services. However if 
Plaintiff's complaint is based on the breach of the'implied" 
contract, through excessive charges, that does constitute a 
Federal Claim. 
The Court fully agrees with the defendant however in 
that in this case, the Court a/ should Restrain itself from 
interferring with the exercise with legislative functions of 
the City, unless the City is out-side of its authority, its 
actions capricious, arbitrary, and or in violation of 
Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights. 
With respect to claim two of the Plaintiff's complaint 
the Plaintiff has failed to show how it is he is being 
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discriminated against and therefore being deprived of equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the United States and the 
Utah Constitution. Plaintiff here allege that the City has 
been involved in a violation of Plaintiff's procedural and 
substantret in due process rights. In suppoirtrof the same the 
plaintiff has not shown that he has been deprived of other 
remedys available. 
The claim under 1983 Civil Right Act cannot be 
substantiated by showing that the defendant has violated the 
State Statutes or State Constitutional law. The Plaintiff has 
argued that the Defendant has acted in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated above cited, but liability under the 1983 Civil 
Rights rests upon violations of the United States Constitution. 
Plaintifffs claim 4, relative to denial of equal 
protection, ~is unsupported by any claim of discrimination or 
against a class to which the Plaintiff belongs. In fact no 
class to which he belongs is identified. Whether the law 
requires a showing of a purposeful discrimination or a 
specific intent on the behalf of the defendant, at this point 
is irrevelant. The Plaintiff has failed to show a denial of 
equal protection. 
Under claim five and six of the Plaintiff fs complaint 
the Court fails to see where the Plaintiff has pled a 
violation of a constitutional law, or an application of the 
Federal or Constitutional Standards. Further more it seems 
clear the claims made in one through six may be articulated 
and sought through other remedial processes i.e. adequate 
State remedies to redress a property damage claim may exist. 
It seem there can be no deprivation of due process of law 
since the due process has not been accessed. Another avenue 
aside from the seeking of a 1983 Civil Rights Claim have nor 
been 
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exhausted but here the Plaintiff has failed ±o show a 
deprivation of a Federal Constitutional protected civil Right* 
The reasons above stated the defendants motion* for 
Summary Judgment with respect from claims one through six and 
all claims against individual defendants shall be dismissed 
and the Summary Judgment granted. 
Counsel for the Defendant is directed to prepare a 
formal order. 
Dated this //d day of August, 1988. 
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